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Frege's Puzzle from a Model-Based Point of 
View
Frege's  puzzle  about  propositional  attitude 
reports can be presented in terms of Superman 
comics.  See  for  example,  Thomas  McKay, 
Michael  Nelson (2010: Propositional  Attitude 
Reports, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy):
At  the  beginning,  Lois  Lane  does  not  realize 
that  Clark  Kent  and  Superman  are  the  same 
person, and she concludes from her observations 
that  Superman is strong, but  Clark Kent is not  
strong.  Thus,  it  is  true that  Lois  believes  that  
Superman  is  strong, and  that  Lois  does  not  
believe  that  Clark  Kent  is  strong.  But  since 
Clark and Superman are the same person, Clark 
Kent = Superman is true as well.
Now, is the rule  F(x) & x=y → F(y) valid as a 
general  logical  principle?  If  it  is,  then,  by 
applying  it  to  true  sentences,  Lois  does  not  
believe  that  Clark  Kent  is  strong,  and  Clark 
Kent  =  Superman,  we  should  obtain  a  true 
sentence:  Lois does not believe that Superman 
is strong. However, the sentence  Lois believes  
that Superman is strong is true as well, which is 
a  contradiction.  Thus,  as  a  general  logical 
principle,  F(x)  &  x=y  →  F(y) seems  to  be 
wrong.
This  kind of  disorder  has caused more than a 
century  of  controversy.  Let's  try  one more 
approach to solving the puzzle.
The model-based approach used below can be 
traced to  Marvin Minsky (1965:  Matter,  Mind 
and Models,  Proceedings of IFIP Congress 65, 
1: 45-49). In my (2009:  Towards Model-Based 
Model of Cognition,  The Reasoner  3(6): 5–6) I 
presented this "robotic ontology" as follows:
“In  my  head,  I  have  a  world  model (an 
incomplete  one,  incoherent,  inconsistent, 
containing all  my knowledge, beliefs,  etc.).  In 
this model, other persons are believed to have 
their own world models. Thus, my world model 
may contain "models of models", for example, a 
simplified model of your world model.” 
But,  despite  the  possible  inconsistency of  my 
world  model,  I  don't  wish  to  admit 
contradictions like Frege's puzzle into it. 
How does Frege's puzzle look from this point of 
view?  At  the  beginning,  Lois'  world  model 
includes  the  axiom  Clark  Kent  ≠  Superman. 
Thus, in Lois' world model, her conclusions that 
Superman  is  strong,  but  Clark  Kent  is  not  
strong do not  contradict  each other.  But,  as  a 
reader of the Superman comics, I know from the 
very beginning that Clark and Superman are the 
same person. Hence, in my world model, Clark 
Kent is strong, but Lois believes the opposite. At 
the end of story,  Lois is forced to  change her 
world model axioms, and Clark becomes strong 
in her model, too. No puzzle here!
What could have caused the “puzzlification” of 
the situation?
The statements  Superman is  strong and  Clark 
Kent is not strong belong to Lois' initial world 
model. In this model,  Superman  ≠ Clark Kent. 
Of course, Lois will not try replacing Superman 
with Clark Kent in these statements.
The statements Lois believes that “Superman is  
strong”, Lois does not believe that “Clark Kent  
is  strong”,  Lois  believes  that  “Superman  ≠ 
Clark  Kent”,  and  Superman  =  Clark  Kent  
belong to the world model of the reader, but the 
parts of the statements in quotes refer to Lois' 
initial world model. Of course, the reader will 
not try replacing Superman with Clark Kent in 
the  statement  parts  referring  to  Lois'  world 
model.
Thus,  one  can  run  into  puzzles  only  by 
confusion of different world models.
A  formal  model  of  the  situation  can  be 
presented  as  follows.  Let's  imagine  that  all 
sentences we are interested in belong to some 
uninterpreted formal  language  plus  some 
suitable  system of  logic.  The  world  model  of 
some person X is represented by a set of axioms, 
which  allows  to  derive  all  sentences  that  X 
believes  in.  Let's  denote  this  axiom  set  by 
WorldModel[X].  If  our  logic  includes  the 
principle  Ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet, 
then  we  must  assume  that  WorldModel[X] 
doesn't  contain  known contradictions.  The 
situation  of  Frege's  puzzle  is  represented  as 
follows:
├ P[Y1] & Y1=Y2 → P[Y2];
WorldModel[X]├ P[Y1] & Y1≠Y2 & ¬P[Y2].
Of course, no puzzle here!
The triviality of this solution is due to the purely 
syntactical character of the approach.  Namely, 
let's regard world models not as “models of the 
world”  with  the  world  itself  as  their  unique 
“reference”. Let's consider world models simply 
as the way that people are thinking and talking 
about  the  world.  When  trying  to  understand 
their  utterances,  let's  analyse  what  people are 
thinking  to  be  true,  and  not  what  is  true  “in 
fact”.
People  are  comparing  and  coordinating  their 
world models. But no “independent jury” can be 
established  for  comparing  of  two  models  M1 
and M2, or for comparing of some model M3 
with its target system S3 in the world. Speaking 
strictly,  I  only  can  compare  things  that  are 
contained  in  my  world  model:  compare  my 
models of the models M1 and M2, or compare 
my model of M3 with my model of S3. 
As demonstrated above, under this approach, at 
least some of the puzzles disappear...
A  similar  formulation  is  attributed  to  Niels 
Bohr:  "There  is  no  quantum  world.  There  is 
only an abstract quantum physical description. It 
is wrong to think the task of physics is to find 
out  how nature  is.  Physics  concerns  what  we 
can  say about  nature."  –  quoted  after  Aage 
Petersen (1963: The Philosophy of Niels Bohr. 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XIX(7): 8–14).
Every utterance comes from the world model of 
the  speaker.  More  generally,  every  sentence 
comes from some kind of world model. It may 
be  the  world  model  of  a  (real  or  imagined) 
person, the world model represented in a novel, 
movie,  scientific  book,  virtual  reality,  etc.  In 
principle,  even  smaller  informational  units 
(stories,  poems,  newspaper  articles,  jokes, 
mathematical  proofs,  video  clips,  dreams, 
hallucinations,  etc.)  may  introduce  their  own 
“partial  world  models”  as  small  additions  to 
“bigger” world models (regarded as background 
knowledge).  Sometimes,  sentences  contain 
references  to  other  world  models.  Trying  to 
understand such sentences, we should identify, 
and keep separated, the world models involved.
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